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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930164-CA
Priority No. 2

SHEILA J. SHIPLER,
Defendant/Appellant«

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and rules are
contained in the text of this brief or in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

R. App. P. 3
R. Crim. P. 26
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990)
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1991)
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(b) (Supp. 1992)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court misinterpret the statutory authority
which governs the reduction of a defendant's conviction to a lower
category of offense?
"Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.

Utah

appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of error
standard, without deference to the trial court."

State v. Bagshaw,

836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord
State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order denying Ms. Shipler's
motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor in the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding.
denial was dated March 9, 1993.

The trial court's order of

(R 58).

The underlying conviction

and the proceedings from which the reduction process stemmed were
specifically noted by the court in its "Findings of Fact."

See

infra Statement of the Facts.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 9, 1993, the trial court denied Ms. Shipler's
motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor.

The "Findings of

Fact" accompanying the court's order of denial are reprinted below:
1. That on October 22, 1990, the defendant entered a
plea of "guilty" to the charge of Theft, a second
degree felony;
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2. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant was
sentenced as a third-degree felony, pursuant to the
provisions of § 76-3-402(1), Utah Code Ann. (1990), to
serve, inter alia, the statutory term of zero-to-five
years incarceration at the Utah State Prison;
3. That on November 19, 1990, the Court suspended the
imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on
probation; and
4. That on October 17, 1991, the Court terminated the
defendants probation as successful without violation.
(R 56-57).

Also included in the November 19, 1990 sentencing order

was "a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not to exceed five years;
(Suspended)."

(R 30).

On December 2, 1992, counsel for Ms. Shipler moved to
reduce her conviction to a class B misdemeanor pursuant to the
mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1990).
(R 37).

Following a continuance, the State opposed Ms. Shipler's

motion and a hearing then was scheduled on the matter.

(R 44-54).

The trial court initially appeared inclined to grant her
motion, asking the prosecutor "What harm is done [by granting the
reduction]?"

(R 86).

Ms. Shipler paid back the funds in question

and fully complied with her probation.

(R 35, 86-87).

In the end,

however, the court denied her motion, reasoning: the "imposition of
sentence" had never been stayed.

(R 91-93).

As more fully discussed below, the court's order was based
on its interpretation of the statutory phrase, "[t]he imposition of
the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on probation[.]"
(R 93); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b).
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Even though the zero-to-

five year term had been stayed, and notwithstanding Adult Probation
and Parole's recommendation to the court that Ms. Shipler's
"Probation be terminated as successful[,]" (R 35), the trial court
concluded that the statute did not apply.

(R 93).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it refused to reduce
Ms. Shipler's conviction to a misdemeanor.

The mandate of the

reduction statute is clear: "Whenever a conviction is for a felony,
the conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if . . . [t]he
imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation, . . . and [s]he is thereafter discharged without
violating [her] probation."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b).

In

the case at bar, the trial court imposed a zero-to-five year prison
sentence on Ms. Shipler.

The court then stayed or suspended the

prison term and placed her on probation.

Upon her successful

completion of probation, Adult Parole and Probation contacted the
court with the recommendation that her probation be terminated.

The

conditions contained in the statute had been met and her reduction
should have been granted.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING THE CONVICTION
BECAUSE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE HAD BEEN STAYED
The statute governing the case at bar, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990) , reads in pertinent part:
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the
conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if:

(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and
the defendant is placed on probation, whether
committed to jail as a condition of probation or
notf and he is thereafter discharged without
violating his probation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (emphasis added).
The issue here centers around the meaning of "imposition of
the sentence."

According to the trial court, this statutory phrase

did not apply to its sentencing order of November 19, 1990.

(R 92);

(R 30) (a copy of the court's "Judgment, Sentence [Commitment]"
order is attached in Addendum B).

The court believed that

imposition of sentence had not been suspended.

(R 93).

Contrary to its claims, on November 19, 1990, the court
sentenced Ms. Shipler "to a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not
to exceed five years; (Suspended)."

(R 30).

The parathetical

"Suspended" notation was typed in by the trial court.

The order

additionally read, "Defendant is granted a stay of the above prison
sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this Court and
under the supervision of [Adult Probation and Parole] . . . "
(emphasis added).
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(R 30)

Despite this language, the trial court believed that it had
only "executed sentence."
executed sentence.

(R 92); (R 93) ("I [the trial court]

I did not suspend imposition of sentence.").

However, the plain language of its order indicates that sentence was
first imposed and then suspended pending completion of probation.
Cf. State v. Bagshawf 836 P.2d at 1386 (Utah App. 1992) (citations
omitted) ("Unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning").
If, as advocated by the State [and accepted by the court],
imposition of sentence is stayed only when the term of imprisonment
is not "set" by the sentencing order, (R 52), the sentencing
provisions would be rendered meaningless.

See also (R 52) (in its

"Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reduce Degree of
Offense", the State claimed, "a sentence is imposed when the term of
imprisonment or incarceration is set").

While a sentence "set" by

the court may be an imposition, it does not follow that an "unset"
sentence is stayed.

(R 52).

A sentence is not merely "stayed" when

left unstated, the sentence does not exist.

Moreover, if recognized

such a "stayed sentence" would leave the "sentenced" person with no
final order from which he or she could appeal.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-18a-l(l)(b); Utah R. App. P. 3; Utah R. Crim. P. 26; Hinkins v.
Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53 (1971).
The flaw in the court/s ruling is further reflected by the
following colloquy:
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: Okay. And so the Court's
finding, just so I am clear on this, is that . . .
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THE COURT: [My November 19, 1990, order was an
execution of the] sentence. I did not suspend
imposition of sentence.
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: Well, the Court did
suspend it. Now, the statute says "stayed" —
THE COURT:

I suspended execution on any confinement.

[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]:

All right.

THE COURT: And placed her on probation on the
following terms and conditions.
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]:

And so —

THE COURT: The only thing I suspended was the
execution on any prison sentence.
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: Okay. The Courtis ruling
is that because the imposition of sentence was not
stayed, is that correct, that the subsection does not
apply?
THE COURT:

Right.

(R 92-93).
The court's ruling suggests that the November 19, 1990,
"Judgment, Sentence [Commitment]" order constituted both an
"execution" and "suspension" of sentence.

(R 30).

According to the

court, when it filled out the order, sentence was "executed.11
(R 92).

However, the very same actions or inactions also

"suspended" imposition of the executed sentence.

(R 92).

Overlooked by the court is the fact that probation is a sentence,
too.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(c).

Under the court's

interpretation of subsection (2)(b), a reduction could never occur
because probation would first have to be "set."

But a court could

not set probation because if that were done, imposition of sentence
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would not have been stayed.

The reduction statute could never be

triggered if, for example, a court "set" a sentence of a $100 fine,
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(a), and immediately stayed payment
in favor of (the successful completion of) probation.

Subsection

(2)(b) should allow a reduction in such circumstances, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b), but the trial court's ruling would not.
A distinction "between the suspension of the imposition and
the suspension of the execution of a sentence. . ." finds no support
in the plain meaning of the statute and would lead to absurd
results.

^R 52); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b); State v. Baqshaw,

836 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1992).

Case law also does not warrant such

an interpretation.
For example, in Baqshaw, "defendant pled guilty to two
counts of obtaining controlled substances by fraud. . . .
Defendant's sentences were suspended and [she] was placed on
probation for eighteen months."

836 P.2d 1384 (emphasis added).

The trial court there, like the court here, noted parenthetically on
its sentencing order that the prison term(s) were "suspended."
Addenda B & C.

See

The courts in both cases also noted, "Defendant is

granted a stay of the above prison sentence and placed on
probation . . . "

See Addenda B & C.

Since Ms. Bagshaw's suspended prison term and her
successful completion of probation fell squarely within subsection
(2)(b), see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1990), the
trial court reduced her convictions to class A misdemeanors.
Baqshaw, 836 P.2d at 1384-85.

On appeal, Ms. Bagshaw argued that
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the reductions should have been to class B misdemeanors.

This Court

agreed, ruling that because the reduction statute failed to specify
the category of misdemeanor intended, "defendant's two third degree
felony convictions should be further reduced from class A to class B
misdemeanor convictions."

Bagshaw, 836 P.2d at 1386.

Ms. Shipler's suspended prison term and her successful
completion of probation should be treated no differently than
Ms. Bagshaw's sentence, particularly since the trial court in both
cases were the same.1

See Addenda B & C.

The authority relied upon by the State is also not
inconsistent with the proper interpretation of a "stayed" imposition
of sentence.

See (R 48-53) (State's "Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion to Reduce Degree of Offense") (citing Williams v.
Harris, 149 P.2d 640 (Utah 1944); State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753
(Utah 1953); State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873 (Utah 1979); State v.
Garnick, 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1980)).

In each cited case, probation

played a critical role in the proceedings.

Although the involved

trial courts may have suspended the imposition of a prison sentence,
the courts nonetheless "set" sentence by imposing a period of
probation.

To say that in those cases the "imposition of sentence"

was "stayed" would be to ignore the order imposing probation and the

1
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presided over the trial
court in Bagshaw and in the case at bar. Compare Addendum B with
Addendum C. In Bagshaw, however, the court did not contend that
imposition of sentence had not been stayed. When Ms. Shipler's
motion was presented, the court changed its position and its reading
of the reduction statute.
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accompanying restrictions and conditions which the defendants were
required to adhere to.2

The trial court's reading of the statute

and its ruling that subsection (2)(b) did not apply is subject to
correction.

2
The trial court's ruling also ignored the State's
argument, "I don't think the legislature ever intended a defendant
to be able to reduce their conviction twice, once at sentencing and
again." (R 85, 91-93). The statute relied on by the State, Utah
Code Ann. section 76-3-402 (Supp. 1991), is inapplicable to the case
at bar. The more restrictive amendments became effective on
April 29, 1991, five months after the November 19, 1990, sentencing
order. By contrast, the unamended version of the statute and the
language in effect at the time of the 1990 sentencing was Utah Code
Ann. section 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990). See (R 30); (R 6-7)
(1990 was the date alleged in the Information); Harris v. Smith, 541
P.2d 343 (Utah 1975) (emphasis in original) ("In State v. Miller we
held that the law in force at the time of sentencing governed and in
Belt v. Turner we held that an amendment to the statute passed after
sentence had been imposed had no effect on the matter"); State v.
Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970); Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah
2d 230, 479 P.2d 791, on reh'q, 25 Utah 2d 380, 483 P.2d 425 (1971);
compare (R 89-90) (a misdemeanor reduction at the 1990 sentencing
would have been proper), with State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah
App. 1991) ("the defendant's sentence . . . [may] be remanded for
resentencing 'because of the clear error in the original
[sentence].'")
Nothing in the 1983 statute prohibits a two degree
reduction. In fact, subsection (2) of the statute mandates a
reduction following one of two stated occurrences. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990); State v. Baqshawf 836 P.2d 1384
(Utah App. 1992). "[S]tatutory interpretation 'must be based on the
language used, . . . and the court has no power to rewrite a statute
to make it conform to an intention not expressed." Cox Rock
Products v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah App.
1988) (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 502 155 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945)); accord
Bagshaw, 836 P.2d at 1385-86 ("where statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, Utah courts do not look to legislative intent"). The
legislature did not amend the reduction statute or express a
contrary intent until 1991. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp.
1991). The limitations now reflected by the 1991 amendments are
separate and apart from the requirements of the 1983 enactment.
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In summary, on November 19, 1990, the trial court sentenced
Ms. Shipler "to a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not to exceed
five years; (Suspended),11

(R 30).

The court granted Ms. Shipler "a

stay of the above (prison) sentence and placed [her] on
probation. . ."

(R 30).

Following Ms. Shipler's adherence to, and

successful completion of the conditions of her probation, Adult
Probation and Parole notified the court and recommended that her
probation be terminated.

(R 35).

The reduction statute could not

have been more aptly worded for the circumstances at hand.

"The

imposition of [Ms. Shipler7s] sentence [was] stayed and [she was]
placed on probation[.]"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b).

Since Ms. Shipler complied with the plain language of the
statute and because the reduction to a misdemeanor is mandatory, see
id. ("the conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor"), her
conviction should be reduced to a class B misdemeanor.

State v.

Baqshaw, 836 P.2d at 1386 (Utah App. 1992) (under the 1990 version
of the reduction statute, "[w]here the code fails to specify the
category of misdemeanor intended, it 'is a class B misdemeanor'").

- 11 -

CONCLUSION
Ms. Sheila Shipler respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's order of denial and reduce her conviction
to a class B misdemeanor.
SUBMITTED this 23

day of June, 1993.

ROtfALD S.xFtiJI
JJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 27>

day of June, 1993.

RONALD S. PIUJINO

DELIVERED by
this

day of June, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

TITLE EL
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sane*
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.

353

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 26

Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filfag with the clerk of the courtfromwhich the
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record.
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) thefr"flljudgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.

77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.

SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
• •

—

- - . - % * %

I - *

.

.

—

—

:

x

l

^

, _

Utah Code Ann. 3 e c .

7 6 - 3 - 4 0 2 f \HZS + $0??. l<V\o\

76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that category of offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense,
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment
of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to
be a misdemeanor i£
(a) The judge designates the sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor;
or
(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not,
"and he is thereafter discharged without violating his probation.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any person from
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.

Utah Cade Ann. S e c . 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 2

{$0?'?* l^Hl )

76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the mature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence
the defendant to an alternative nonzially applicable to that offense, the court
may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor i£
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in
the interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a
class A misdemeanor,
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any personfromobtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff.

.

vs.
SHIPLER. SHEILA J.
DOB;

7/28/64

t

I
f
\
(
1

Ort.nd.nt

ft
»

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Case No.
9019Q1599 FS
Count No. two
Honorable KENNFTH KTKTKTT?
Clerk
Constance George
Reporter
Carlton Way
Bailiff
Stan Jacobson
D.t.
N.v«.ber 19, 1990

• The motion of R. Scowcrctfetenter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant havingbeen convicted by D a jury; D the court; • plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
^heft
a felony
of the *>** degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented hyp Q m w m f f
and the State being represented by T VuyV
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life; d \ \Q \ cX/O /
k^r m not to exceed five years; (Suspended).
i i r\ i _ _ Q r\ o ^ o D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
\ r<xO
i O * 0*2C5 a ' r v v ^
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
tfp m and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ - i l £ 2 £ l S ° $ 6 0 ( K **? w o r k o f f t h r u C o ™/Ser at $5.Hr
* and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to ^ e 0 n r a ^ fn T ? flawing
$

B

D
D
•
D
uP, ft

Deft

t o pav $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 Vir-tim Kefiff fuMnTi Agspgs 7 P P . & $ 7 0 0 . 0 0 Barmipomo^t V** +„ JJ D A

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of • State, Q Defense, Q Court, Count(s)

LJLJ

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of 36 months
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County a for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
D Commitment shall issue
DATED this _21st<Jay of Novemi

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page i
(YeHow—Jatl/PnsonMP&P)

(Pink—Defense)

of J :

(Goldenrod—State)
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Judgment/State v.

901901599 FS
fCR
/Honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP

SHIPLER, SHEILA J.

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
D# 9 Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
O Serve
—
—
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
$/ m Pay a fine in the amount of $100° -> at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
r
Parole; or D at the rate of ($600.00 may be worked o f f a t the r a t e Sg.OO Hr.~*fooyk ( W ^ (**#**
(' • Pay restitution in the amount of $ — ; or Otin afiamgunt to be determined by the Department <# Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
^ *^~ZX* u*#; 0 r D at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, (reserved f o r hearing)
}^ • Enter, participate in, and complete any ffefltal Health »
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole/*'U/JuJ^
i*JLd*Z+
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
D Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or D with
O Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
D Submit to drug testing.
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
D Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
' V Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
Q Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
Tfi. Defendant is to commit no crimes.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on
_ _ f o r a review of this sentence
•

Tl»f PnHgrH-

f-n p a y

$700.00

T^pfpnH^rt^

m

pay

$950

Pprmipo

/QpfgnHanr

fn

n n f n<aP n f p n c c p c ^ a n y rrorH

OO Vlnfl-m

m

p^f

Vaa

fn

T?oefi>nHnn

r

TT1A
A « " ? m t

rarHc

??*

anr4/^T- ~*)~~YlT\£

acCQUTltC ? t C

D
D
DATED this

*>} day of

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Page

2
* of

KENNETH RIGTRUP
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S T A T E OP" U T A H

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE

PROGRESS/VIOWrON REPORT
TO:

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Salt Lake County, Utah

REGARDING:

ATTN:

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

CASE NO.:

FROM:

Field Operations/Region III

OFFENSE:

DATE:

August 21, 1991

PROBATION DATE:

November 21, 1990

Robert

9019015ftfl;d Judicial District
npj 4 7 jggj
**iru«COUNTY

OBSCIS:

EMPLOYMENT: West Valley Child Care
ADDRESS:
5720 W. 3575 S.; West Valley City, UT 84120
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:

Shipler, Sheila Joy
_
m9mmm

00059Q&*—kr*

Y^

£>«&-**

5720 W. 3575 S.

Scowcroft

COMMENTS: On November 21, 1990, the defendant was ordered 36 months
probation with the following special conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Usual/ordinary conditions of 36 months probation;
Pay $1000-00 fine;
Pay restitution in the amount $5000.00;
Enter, participate in and complete mental health substance abuse
counseling;
Maintain full-time employment;
Commit no new crimes;
Pay $200.00 to Legal Defender's Association;
Pay $250.00 to Victim Restitution Assessment Fee;
No checking account or credit cards while on probation.

As of August 9, 1991, the defendant reports monthly and has satisfied all
special conditions of her probation.
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT:
RECOMMENDATION:

NOTIFY THE COURT AND SUPERVISOR.

Probation be terminated as successful.

Lanchard, SUPERVISOR

1€ Eskelson, PROBATiON/OFF-T
Teague
APPROVED AND ORDERED:

-- ..r\\:.-;-

fcg&jil

DENIED:
DATE:

T

COMMENTS:

9255p/vcr

00035

ADDENDUM C

— N l & B I M J U U UIK?S7

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA
iCOUNTY

T H E STATE OF UTAH.

Plaintiff.

r, SENTENCE
JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

v

vs.

I
!

J

JVTP»»

_

, ,

(
\

3-?1-(o)
Defendant

'

Case No.

MrtfltfiM FS

Honorable f^nn gTn Tftg-feup
Clerk
flr»AK-M#J/t*.
U.&OtO*.
Reporter h\<tt
W+nti
Bailiff & f a n T a r n f e t f N /
Date
f ] n / f j fl/, W

O The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is Q granted 0 denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by 0 a jury: Q the court: j£ plea of guilty:
O plea of no contest: of the offense *»fflfrttthing Or*riroMSub&noe.lu^
felony
LdX of the -*2cd degree, D a class _
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented *yn&±'jikiiimau
and the State being represented ty&lenilQaski js.now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
a to a maximum mandatory term of _ _ _ _ _ years and which may be for life:
t ^ - X not to exceed five years: (SU&pjnded)
CoaM< X.
g^q Q O o n
Q of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years:
cs Q
C V - * CN
D of not less than five years and which may be for life:
O* 0 ~ o f t - O^ol0-"*"^.
[/£- * n o t to exceed ^ f r — y e a r s : (Suspended)
J OLMt 3P
^ f .
tjfa*X
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of « IM**'
mnjj (j^EK Of? *3CD~* 4.flW»* HMU
|gW
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of S
to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
tffrjC
I N i v f e n ^ n f +*H2JL[ S/5S. c *Vtfl1/rto fr<+fttK/r>ri /L«gSS/WgM< ass
Q such sentence is to run concurrently with _ _ _ _ _
,,,_,
YD. J * such sentence is to run consecutively with , Z * w . . * » dA*t C^^zt^
a upon motion of a State, C Defense, O Court. Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
&s J6 Defendant is granted a stay of the above (X prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent. Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of Jfe fHO/VT-fiS
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Q for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper. Utah, or C for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment
D Commitment shall issue
*

JzTdayof
DATED this _=*ZTday
of
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

M ^ ,

JXST/

M"^u
^OISTRICT COllRTtfUDGE

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
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